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The electoral success of the neo-fascist Alleanza Nazionale in Italy in 1994 came as a 
surprise to many Italians, argues Franco Ferraresi, only because contemporary right-wing 
movements have received little scholarly attention in Italy since 1945. Few should have 
been surprised by the electoral outcome of 1994, because the pre-cursor of the Alleanza 
Nazionale, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) had proven itself to be "the most 
enduring neofascist organization in any advanced industrial country." (p. 3) The 
parliamentary MSI had been paralleled by an extra-parliamentary radical Right between 
the 1940s and the early 1980s, which established Italy as the only European country with 
a long history of "social revolutionary" radical-Right terrorism. Ferraresi contends that 
the development of so significant a radical Right presence was only possible with "the 
support of elements outside the radical Right proper" which ensured that "moderate and 
conservative public opinion [has] been sympathetic toward the right-wing groups." (p. 3-
4)  
While that segment of extreme Right politics which is prepared to subscribe to political 
violence and terrorism traditionally has been seen as the underground instruments of the 
parliamentary Right and their allies in the intelligence services, Ferraresi contends that 
that the radical Right had very much a life of its own, with its own membership, its own 
ideology and aspirations, and its own way of relating to the other right-wing groups. The 
historical examination of the Italian radical Right as an independent phenomenon is the 
purpose of Ferraresi's study.  
Ferraresi identifies three chronological phases in the development of the post-1945 
radical Right in Italy. The period from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s is significant for 
the emergence of the "historic groups." The "strategy of tension" took place between the 
late 1960s and the mid-1970s. With the failure of this strategy of tension, there followed 
the period of the "armed spontaneity" from 1975 until the elimination of the radical Right 
terrorist groups in the early 1980s.  
Following an initial period of MSI hegemony on the Right while neofascism restored 
itself as a political force following the defeat of 1945, the radical Right differentiated 
itself from the MSI in the mid-1950s with the formation of the so-called "historic 
groups," Ordine Nuovo (ON) and Avanguardia Nazionale (AN). These "historic 
groups"split from the MSI because they believed that the strategy of the MSI leadership 
in collaborating with the Christian Democrats (DC) in an anti-Communist front was 
doomed to failure. This became evident with the decision of the DC to join the Socialist 
Party (PSI) in the "opening to the left" of the early 1960s.  
One of the elements that set the radical Right apart from the parliamentary MSI was the 
former's intense interest in its ideological stance. While drawing some of its ideology 
from the Fascist period, the radical Right was selective, identifying primarily with the 
early revolutionary thrust of pre-war Fascism and with the rejection of democracy in 
favor of "the values of élitism, natural hierarchies, and strongly enforced authoritarian 
rule." (p. 32) Underlying much of the ideology was a "disproportionate overevaluation of 
the spiritual dimension of man," (p. 34) from which came an affinity for the mystique of 
violence and a search for heros and validating myths. The 1922-43 period of Fascist rule 
did not provide as much by way of usable myth as did the 1943-45 period of the Italian 
Social Republic, with its legionary fighters in a losing cause for a doomed regime. The 
ability to endure and expect death as well as to deliver death were obsessions of the 
radical Right which also admired the German Nazis who were perceived to have been in 
a continuous revolution for renewal.  
The writings of Julius Evola (1898-1974), "by far the most important intellectual figure 
for the contemporary radical Right," (p. 43) fused these scattered items into a coherent 
ideology for the radical Right. Ferraresi claims that Evola's thought "can be considered 
one of the most radical and consistent antiegalitarian, antiliberal, antidemocratic, and 
antipopular systems in the twentieth century." (p. 44) Evola sought to "construct a model 
of man striving to reach the 'absolute' within his inner self," (p. 44) rejecting all of 
modern society as decadent and declining into a morass of materialism. A regeneration of 
the state was necessary, to be led by a male elite imbued with spiritual values and 
prepared to fight for these values. The true man must act in a decadent world by 
following the dictates of his inner law.  
The "historic groups"provided the link between the veterans of the wartime Italian Social 
Republic and the terrorists of the 1970s. During its existence, the ON involved itself in 
street-fighting but also linked up with international revolutionary agencies, such as the 
OAS in Algeria. It also had links with the CIA and elements within the Italian state 
apparatus, such as the intelligence services, which wanted to bring about political change 
in Italy. The AN, founded in 1959 and dissolved in 1976, was primarily a terrorist action 
squad, often infiltrating left-wing student action groups.  
The "strategy of tension" was developed with the radical Right groups in the 1960s in 
reaction to the "opening to the left" of that decade. Both the radical Right and certain 
elements within the state apparatus, including sections of the army, the judiciary, and 
members of the business and financial community wanted, by any means, to halt the 
advance of the political Left. They came together at an organizational conference in 1965 
and developed the strategy of tension, which involved challenging the Left on the 
subversive and revolutionary level until such time as the army and the police would be 
able to stage a coup d'état to reestablish law and order, secure control of the government 
and exclude the parties of the Left. The model was provided by the coup d'état of the 
Greek colonels in 1967, and student and worker unrest of 1968 and 1969 provided the 
opportunity for implementing the strategy of tension.  
On 7 December 1970, what appears to have been an abortive coup d'état occurred under 
the leadership of Prince Junio Valerio Borghese and his National Front with the support 
of the P2 Masonic Lodge. While the action was cancelled at the last minute, the evidence 
of a thwarted coup was overlooked by state authorities. The participants in the coup and 
other terrorists of the Right were viewed benevolently by the police and, when these 
terrorists were put on trial, were treated generously by the judiciary. Occasionally, 
members of radical Right groups even carried out terrorist acts with the connivance of 
segments of the state apparatus, which then provided protection for these terrorists. 
Ferraresi illustrates his thesis by examining the investigations and trials of members of 
the radical Right who were responsible for terrorist acts in 1969 and 1970. He 
demonstrates the way in which the police, the intelligence services and the judiciary 
conspired to protect the terrorists.  
During the early 1970s, the radical Right groups developed an interest in the systematic 
use of terrorism for revolutionary goals. This phase of terrorism reached its most deadly 
heights with bombings in Brescia and on the MŸnich-Rome express in 1974, which 
coincided with a variety of plans for coups d'état. The result of this overt radical Right 
terrorism was the government dissolution of the Ordine Nuovo in 1974 and Avanguardia 
Nazionale in 1975, although many of the responsible individuals were protected by their 
patrons within the state apparatus. As the radical Right reorganized after 1974, their focus 
became not so much the corrupt party system but, inspired by the now-active Left-wing 
Red Brigades, the state itself.  
The dissolution of the "historic groups" in the mid-1970s introduced the new phase of the 
"armed spontanaiety." The move toward the parliamentary alliance of the "Historic 
Compromise" between the DC and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) met increased 
activity by left-wing terrorists culminating in the 1978 kidnap and murder of former 
Prime Minister Aldo Moro. These developments coincided with a social and cultural 
phemomenon known as the "1977 Movement" whereby those on the fringes of Left and 
Right, the feminists, the environmentalists and the unemployed came together in 
opposition to the anticipated corruption of the "Historic Compromise." The 1977 
Movement offered a new pattern of social and intellectual analysis. "Not by chance one 
of the most important influences was that of feminism, which focused attention on 
personal life. What now came to the fore was sexuality, self-determination, rejection of 
authoritarianism, of male-dominated politics. Needs and desires became crucial, the 
former taken from the Marxist tradition . . . The latter from the psychoanalytical one . . . 
both, needless to say, vulgarized when not outrightly perverted." (p. 153) As a result of 
this thinking, "Action was legitimized on the basis of desire, regardless of any notion of 
responsibility, of political obligation. Desire was seen as the only force leading to 
personal liberation against the system's suffocating powers." (p. 153)  
This cultural shift coincided with the rise of a new generation of radical Right militants 
who had greater affinity with radical Left militants than with the established powers of 
the state. Rationality and logical explanations were rejected in favor of the existential 
terrorism of the armed spontanaiety, just as the new militants rejected the leadership of 
the MSI and also the mythos of the "historic groups." Terrorist action became an end in 
itself. While the armed spontanaiety envisaged disconnected cells in an "archipelago" of 
radical Right activity, Ferraresi raises the question of whether there may have been a 
higher degree of organization in existence than has yet been discovered. The new 
generation of terrorists were no longer linked to groups within the political bureaucracy 
as had been the case in the strategy of tension. While existential terrorism existed on the 
Left and caused problems in rationalizing it with Marxist-Leninist principles, it caused no 
such problems on the Right, where it could be seen as a return to the purifying actions of 
the original heros of Fascism in a new quest for personal and social renewal. The 
excesses of the armed spontaneity, coupled with more effective police work in the early 
1980s eventually brought the period of terrorism to an end and also eliminated the radical 
Right from the Italian political scene.  
Ferraresi concludes his study by indicating that, when the clean hands investigations of 
the early 1990s eliminated virtually the entire Italian party system, the MSI was available 
as one of the few parties not tainted with political corruption and, renamed as the 
Alleanza Nazionale, was able to participate in the 1994 government of Silvio Berlusconi. 
To take the full measure of the Right in contemporary Italian politics, it is essential to 
understand the political and ideological tradition associated with the Right and the radical 
Right in Italy.  
Ferraresi's discussion of the self-perception of the radical Right is very much in line with 
the definition of Fascism as a movement for personal and national self-renewal as 
adumbrated by historians such as Roger Griffin. In fact, by exploring the intellectual 
underpinnings of Italy's radical Right in the latter half of the twentieth century, Ferraresi 
not only substantiates the definition by Griffin and others in International Fascism: 
Theories, Causes and the New Consensus (1998) but also lends credence to the assertion 
that there is a core intellectual tradition to Fascism which supersedes the traditional "Age 
of Fascism" between 1918 and 1945.  
Ferraresi has based his study on those sources for the activities of the radical Right and 
their supporters which are available to him. These include primarily the record of 
investigations and trials associated with the various acts of terrorism of the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. He has painstakingly tracked the judicial process through trial transcripts and 
has noted the contradictions and the dead ends which are evident in those sources. He has 
also looked at the publications, proclamations and pamphlets of the radical Right and, 
from these, has been able to piece together the ideology of the radical Right in its various 
manifestations.  
His study is commendable in linking the threads of radical Right activity and exploring 
this relatively-unknown substratum of Italian political culture. His study provides a 
context and an insight into Italian neofascism and convincingly establishes its linkage 
with elements of the state apparatus. His discussion of the underlying ideology of the 
radical Right is an invaluable contribution to fascist studies. He has made a great deal out 
of the sources available to him and, if there is any criticism of the book, it rests on the 
fact that he is limited in the evidence that he can gather on the terrorist groups about 
which he writes. There is a strong emphasis on the uniting factor of ideology and yet, as 
we know from the experience of studying Mussolini's pre-1943 Fascism, ideology was 
not always the motivating factor in understanding fascist behavior. At some future date, 
one hopes that more sources about the individual radical Right groups will become 
available, so that the picture which Ferraresi offers can be fleshed out by examining the 
social context and understanding more the personal background of those individuals who 
were active participants in the radical Right of this period.  
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